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This paper aims to provide modal foundations for mathematical pla-
tonism. I examine Hale and Wright’s (2009) objections to the merits and
need, in the defense of mathematical platonism and its epistemology, of
the thesis of Necessitism. In response to Hale and Wright’s objections
to the role of epistemic and metaphysical modalities in providing justi-
fication for both the truth of abstraction principles and the success of
mathematical predicate reference, I examine the Necessitist commitments
of the abundant conception of properties endorsed by Hale and Wright
and examined in Hale (2013a); examine cardinality issues which arise de-
pending on whether Necessitism is accepted at first- and higher-order; and
demonstrate how a multi-dimensional intensional approach to the episte-
mology of mathematics, augmented with Necessitism, is consistent with
Hale and Wright’s notion of there being epistemic entitlement rationally
to trust that abstraction principles are true. Epistemic and metaphysical
modality may thus be shown to play a constitutive role in vindicating the
reality of mathematical objects and truth, and in explaining our possible
knowledge thereof.
1 Introduction
Modal notions have been availed of, in order to argue in favor of nominalist
approaches to mathematical ontology. Field (1989) argues, for example, that
mathematical modality can be treated as a logical consistency operator on a
set of formulas comprising an empirical theory, such as Newtonian mechanics,
in which the mathematical vocabulary has been translated into the vocabulary
of physical geometry.1 Putnam (1967), Parsons (1983), Chihara (1990), and
1For a generalization of Field’s nominalist translation scheme to the differential equations
in the theory of General Relativity, see Arntzenius and Dorr (2012).
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Hellman (1993) argue that intensional models both of first- and second-order
arithmetic and of set theory motivate an eliminativist approach to mathematical
ontology. On this approach, reference to mathematical objects can be eschewed,
and possibly the mathematical structures at issue are nothing.2
This essay aims to provide modal foundations for mathematical platonism,
i.e., the proposal that mathematical terms for sets; functions; and the natu-
ral, rational, real, and imaginary numbers refer to abstract – necessarily non-
concrete – objects. Intensional constructions of arithmetic and set theory have
been developed by, inter alia, Fine (1981); Parsons (1983); Shapiro (1985); My-
hill (1985); Reinhardt (1988); Nolan (2002); Linnebo (2013); and Studd (2013).
Williamson (2013; 2014) emphasizes that mathematical languages are exten-
sional, although in Williamson (2016) he argues that Orey sentences, such as
the generalized continuum hypothesis – 2ℵα = ℵα+1 – which are currently un-
decidable relative to the axioms of the language of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory
with choice as augmented by large cardinal axioms, are yet possibly decidable.3
Khudairi (ms) argues that the epistemic interpretation of multi-dimensional
intensional semantics provides a novel approach to the epistemology of math-
ematics, such that if the decidability of mathematical axioms is epistemically
possible, then their decidability is metaphysically possible.4 Epistemic mathe-
matical modality, suitably constrained, can thus serve as a guide to metaphysical
mathematical modality.5 Hamkins and Löwe (2007; 2013) argue that the modal
2For further discussion of modal approaches to nominalism, see Burgess and Rosen (1997:
II, B-C) and Leng (2007; 2010: 258).
3Compare Reinhardt (1974) on the imaginative exercises taking the form of counterfactuals
concerning the truth of undecidable formulas. See Maddy (1988), for critical discussion.
4The epistemic interpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics is first advanced
in Chalmers (1996; 2004).
5See Section 4, for further discussion. Gödel (1951: 11-12) anticipates a similar distinction
between epistemic and metaphysical readings of the determinacy of mathematical truths,
by distinguishing between mathematics in its subjective and objective senses. The former
concerns decidable formulas, while the latter records the values of formulas defined, owing to
the incompleteness theorems, in a variant of the language augmented by stronger axioms of
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logic of set-forcing extensions and the corresponding logic for their ground mod-
els satisfy at least S4.2, i.e., axioms K [(φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ)]; T (φ →
φ); 4 (φ →φ); and G (⋄φ → ⋄φ). While the foregoing approaches are
consistent with realism about mathematical objects, they are nevertheless not
direct arguments thereof. The aim of this essay is to redress the foregoing la-
cuna, and thus to avail of the resources of modal ontology and epistemology in
order to argue for the reality of mathematical entities and truth.
In Section 2, I outline the elements of the abstractionist foundations of
mathematics. In Section 3, I examine Hale and Wright (2009)’s objections to
the merits and need, in the defense of mathematical platonism and its episte-
mology, of the thesis of Necessitism, underlying the thought that whatever can
exist actually does so. The Necessitist thesis is codified by the converse Barcan
formula (cf. Barcan, 1946; 1947), and states that possibly if there is something
which satisfies a condition, then there is something such that it possibly satisfies
that condition: ⋄∃xφx → ∃x⋄φx. I argue that Hale and Wright’s objections to
Necessitism as a requirement on admissible abstraction can be answered; and I
examine both the role of the higher-order Necessitist proposal in their endorse-
ment of an abundant conception of properties, as well as cardinality issues that
arise depending on whether Necessitism is accepted at first- and higher-order.
In Section 4, I provide an account of the role of epistemic and metaphysical
modality in explaining the prima facie justification to believe the truth of ad-
missible abstraction principles, and demonstrate how it converges with both
Hale and Wright’s (op. cit.) and Wright’s (2012; 2014) preferred theory of de-
fault entitlement rationally to trust the truth of admissible abstraction. Section
5 provides concluding remarks.
infinity.
3
2 The Abstractionist Foundations of Mathemat-
ics
The abstractionist foundations of mathematics are inspired by Frege’s (1884/1980;
1893/2013) proposal that cardinal numbers can be explained by specifying an
equivalence relation, expressible in the signature of second-order logic and iden-
tity, on lower-order representatives for higher-order entities. Thus, e.g., in Frege
(1884/1980: 64), the direction of the line, a, is identical to the direction of the
line, b, if and only if lines a and b are parallel. In Frege (op. cit.: 68) and
Wright (1983: 104-105), the cardinal number of the concept, A, is identical to
the cardinal number of the concept, B, if and only if there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between A and B, i.e., there is an injective and surjective (bijective)
mapping, R, from A to B. With Nx: a numerical term-forming operator,
• ∀A∀B∃R[[Nx: A = Nx: B ≡ ∃R[∀x[Ax → ∃y(By ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Bz ∧ Rxz
→ y = z))] ∧ ∀y[By → ∃x(Ax ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Az ∧ Rzy → x = z))]].
The foregoing is referred to as ’Hume’s Principle’.6 Frege’s Theorem states
that the Dedekind-Peano axioms for the language of arithmetic can be derived
from the Hume’s Principle, as augmented to the signature of second-order logic
and identity.7 Abstraction principles have further been specified both for the
6Frege (1884/1980: 68) writes: ’the Number which belongs to the concept F is the extension
of the concept ’[equinumerous] to the concept F’ (cf. op. cit.: 72-73). Boolos (1987/1998: 186)
coins the name, ’Hume’s Principle’, for Frege’s abstraction principle for cardinals, because
Frege (op. cit.: 63) attributes equinumerosity as a condition on the concept of number to
Hume (1739-1740/2007: Book 1, Part 3, Sec. 1, SB71), who writes: ’When two numbers are
so combin’d, as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we
pronounce them equal . . . ’. Frege notes that identity of number via bijections is anticipated by
the mathematicians, Ernst Schröder and Ernst Kossak, as well Cantor (1883/1996: Sec. 1),
who writes: ’[E]very well-defined set has a determinate power; two sets have the same power
if they can be, element for element, correlated with one another reciprocally and one-to-one’,
where the power [Anzahl] of a set corresponds to its cardinality (cf. Cantor, 1895/2007: 481).
7Cf. Dedekind (1888/1996) and Peano (1889/1967). See Wright (1983: 154-169) for a proof
sketch of Frege’s theorem; Boolos (1987) for the formal proof thereof; and Parsons (1964) for
an incipient conjecture of the theorem’s validity.
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real numbers (cf. Hale, 2000a; Shapiro, 2000; and Wright, 2000), and for sets
(cf. Wright, 1997; Shapiro and Weir, 1999; Hale, 2000b; and Walsh, 2016).
The philosophical significance of the abstractionist program consists primar-
ily in its provision of a neo-logicist foundation for classical mathematics, and in
its further providing a setting in which to examine constraints on the identity
conditions constitutive of mathematical concept possession.8 The philosophical
significance of the abstractionist program consists, furthermore, in its circum-
vention of Benacerraf’s (1973) challenge to the effect that our knowledge of
mathematical truths is in potential jeopardy, because of the absence of natu-
ralistic, in particular causal, conditions thereon. Abstraction principles provide
an epistemic conduit into our knowledge of abstracta, because a grasp of the
right-hand side of the principles – i.e., the equivalence relation on lower-order
entities, such as the equinumerosity of two, distinct objects – is explanatory of
the left-hand side of the principles – i.e., a grasp of the identity of the numbers
of the higher-order entities (the concepts) under which those objects fall. Both
Wright (1983: 13-15) and Hale (1987: 10-15) argue, then, that the abstraction
principles are epistemically tractable, only if (i) the surface syntax of the prin-
ciples – e.g., the term-forming operators referring to objects – are a perspicuous
guide to their logical form; and (ii) the principles satisfy Frege’s (1884/1980: X)
context principle, such that the truth of the principles is secured prior to the
reference of the terms figuring therein.
8Shapiro and Linnebo (2015) prove that Heyting arithmetic can be recovered from Frege’s
Theorem. Criteria for consistent abstraction principles are examined in, inter alia, Hodes
(1984a); Hazen (1985); Boolos (1990/1998); Heck (1992); Fine (2002); Weir (2003); Cook and
Ebert (2005); Linnebo and Uzquiano (2009); Linnebo (2010); and Walsh (op. cit.).
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3 Abstraction and Necessitism
3.1 Hale and Wright’s Arguments against Necessitism
One crucial objection to the abstractionist program is that – while abstraction
principles might provide a necessary and sufficient truth-condition for our grasp
of the concepts of mathematical objects – an explanation of the actual truth of
the principles has yet to be advanced (cf. Eklund, 2006; 2016). In response, Hale
and Wright (2009: 197-198) proffer a tentative endorsement of an ‘abundant’
conception of properties, according to which fixing the sense of a predicate will
be sufficient for predicate reference. Eklund (2006: 102) suggests, by contrast,
that one way for the truth of the abstraction principles to be explained is by
presupposing what he refers to as a ‘Maximalist’ position concerning the target
ontology.9 According to the ontological Maximalist position, if it is possible that
a term has a certain extension, then actually the term does have the designated
extension.
Hale and Wright (op. cit.) raise two issues for the ontological Maximalist
proposal. The first is that ontological Maximalism is committed to a proposal
that they take to be independently objectionable, namely ontological Neces-
sitism (185). Hale and Wright (op. cit.) raise a similar contention to the effect
that actual, and not merely possible, reference is what the abstractionist pro-
gram intends to target; and that Maximalism and Necessitism, so construed, are
purportedly silent on the status of ascertaining when the possibilities at issue
are actual.
The second issue that Hale and Wright find with Maximalism is that it mis-
construes the demands that the abstractionist program is required to address.
9For further discussion of ontological Maximalism, see Hawley (2007) and Sider (2007: IV).
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The abstractionist program is supposed to be committed to ontological Maxi-
malism, because the possibility that a term has a certain extension will otherwise
not be sufficient for the success of the term’s reference. It is further thought
that, without an appeal to Maximalism, and despite the actuality of successful
mathematical predicate reference, there are yet possible situations in which the
mathematical predicates still do not refer (193). In response, they note that no
‘collateral metaphysical assistance’ – such as ontological Maximalism would be
intended to provide – is necessary in order to explain the truth of abstraction
principles (op. cit.). Rather, there is prima facie, default entitlement rationally
to trust that the abstraction principles are actually true, and such entitlement
is sufficient to foreclose upon the risk that possibly the mathematical terms
therein do not refer (192).
In the remainder of this section, I will argue that Hale and Wright’s ob-
jections to Necessitism and the ontological Maximalist approach to admissible
abstraction both can be answered, and in any case are implicit in their en-
dorsement of the abundant conception of properties. In the following section,
I address their second contention, and I argue for the fundamental role that
Maximalism and Necessitism can play in warranting the truth of candidate ab-
stractions and mathematical platonism.
The principle of the necessary necessity of being (NNE) can be derived from
the converse Barcan formula.10 NNE states that necessarily everything is nec-
essarily such that there is something to which it is identical; ∀x∃y(x = y).
Informally, necessarily everything has necessary being, i.e. everything is some-
thing, even if contingently non-concrete. Williamson (2013: 6.1-6.4) targets
issues for haecceity comprehension, if the negations of the converse Barcan for-
10Cf. Williamson (2013: 38).
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mula and NNE are true at first-order, and thus for objects. With regard to
properties and relations at higher-order, Williamson’s arguments have targeted
closure conditions, given a modalized interpretation of comprehension principles
(op. cit.). The latter take the form, ∃X∀x(Xx ⇐⇒ φ), with x an individual
variable which may occur free in φ and X a monadic first-order predicate variable
which does not occur free in φ (262).11 He targets, in particular, the principle of
mathematical induction – with s a successor function and the quantifier ranging
over the natural numbers: ∀X[[X0 ∧ ∀n(Xn → Xsn)] → ∀n(Xn)] – and notes
that instances of mathematical induction – e.g., for a an individual constant,
∃R[[Ra0 ∧ ∀n(Ran → Rasn)] → ∀n(Ran)] – presuppose, for their derivation,
the validity of instances of the higher-order modal comprehension scheme: e.g.,
∃X∀n(Xn ⇐⇒ Ran) (283-284). The foregoing provides prima facie abductive
support for the requirement of Necessitism in the practice of mathematics. The
constitutive role of the Necessitist modal comprehension scheme in the principle
of mathematical induction answers Hale and Wright’s first contention against
the Necessitist commitments of ontological Maximalism.
Metaphysical universality is Williamson’s term for model-theoretic validity
in the metaphysical setting (95). Let a formula be a logical truth if and only
if its truth is preserved under every assignment of values to the variables com-
prising the formula’s syntactic form. Logical validity can, then, be defined as
the preservation of the truth of a formula on all interpretations of the logical
constants from classes of models to classes of models.
As a definition of validity unique to metaphysics, metaphysically universal
formulas are valid on the interpretation of both the logical and the non-logical
constants. The non-logical constants have values from various metaphysical
11The contingentist, by contrast, can – by rejecting the Barcan formula – countenance only
‘intra-world’ comprehension principles in which the modal operators and iterations thereof
take scope over the entire formula; e.g. ⋄∀x∃X(Xx ⇐⇒ φ) (cf. Sider, 2016: 686).
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domains in their extension. Williamson refers to the assignments for models
in the metaphysical setting as universal interpretations (59). The analogue for
logical truth occurs when a truth is metaphysically universal, i.e., only if its
second-order universal generalization is true on the intended interpretation of
the metalanguage (200). The connection between truth-in-a-model and truth
simpliciter is then that – asWilliamson puts it laconically – when ’the framework
at least delivers a condition for a modal sentence to be true in a universal
interpretation, we can derive the condition for it to be true in the intended
universal interpretation, which is the condition for it to be true simpliciter’ (op.
cit.).
One of the crucial interests of the metaphysical universality of formulas is
that the models in the class need not be pointed, in order to countenance the
actuality of the possible formulas defined therein.12 Rather, the class of true,
possible propositions generated by the metaphysically universal possible formu-
las is sufficient for the formulas actually to be true (268-269).13 To see this, let
the quantifier for worlds in modal formulas which are true simpliciter range over
real metaphysically possible worlds. Suppose that the converse Barcan formula
is true such that, possibly if there is something which satisfies a condition then
there is something such that possibly it satisfies that condition. Then, because
there is something which possibly does so, Williamson writes that ’since what-
ever is is, whatever is actually is: if there is something, then there actually
is such a thing’ (23). When the quantifier ranges, then, over possible worlds
treated as objects, the worlds are thus actual. So – by contrast to modal formu-
las which are true-in-a-model – the objects, i.e. actual worlds, which fall within
the range of the quantifiers in the metaphysically universal formulas which are
12That the models are unpointed is noted in Williamson (2013: 100).
13Thanks here to xx for discussion.
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true simpliciter can explain why such formulas are actual.
The constitutive role of metaphysical universality in bridging the necessary
necessity of being with the actuality thereof answers Hale and Wright’s con-
tention that the interaction between the possible and actual truth of abstraction
principles has yet to be accounted for.14
3.2 Hale on the Necessary Being of Purely General Prop-
erties and Objects
Note, further, that the abundant conception of properties endorsed by Hale
and Wright depends upon the Necessitist Thesis, and the truth of ontological
Maximalism thereby. Hale writes: ‘[I]t is sufficient for the actual existence of a
property or relation that there could be a predicate with appropriate satisfac-
tion conditions . . . purely general properties and relations exist as a matter of
(absolute) necessity’, where a property is purely general if and only if there is
a predicate for which, and it embeds no singular terms (Hale, 2013b: 133, 135;
see also 2013a: 99-100).15
Hale argues for the necessary necessity of being for properties and propo-
sitions as follows (op. cit.: 135; 2013b: 167). Suppose that p refers to the
proposition that a property exists, and that q refers to the proposition that
a predicate for the property exists. Let the necessity operator be defined as
a counterfactual with an unrestricted, universally quantified antecedent, such
14Cook (2016: 398) demonstrates how formally to define modal operators within Hume’s
Principle, i.e. the consistent abstraction principle for cardinal numbers. Necessitist Hume’s
Principle takes the form: ∀X,Y[#(X) = #(Y) ⇐⇒ X ≈ Y], where X and Y are second-
order variables, # is a numerical term-forming operator, ≈ is a bijection, and for variables,
x,y, of arbitrary type ‘x = y ⇐⇒ ∃z[z = x ∧ z = y ∧ ∃w(w = z)]’. See Cook (op. cit.)
for further discussion.
15Cook (op. cit.: 388) notes the requirement of Necessitism in the abundant conception
of properties, although does not discuss points at which Williamson’s and Hale’s Necessitist
proposals might be inconsistent. The points of divergence between the two variations on the
proposal are examined below.
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that, for all propositions, ψ: [ψ ⇐⇒ ∀φ(φ → ψ)] (135).16 On the abun-
dant conception of properties, [p ⇐⇒ ⋄q]. Intuitively: Necessarily, there is
a property if and only if possibly there is a predicate for that property. Given
the counterfactual analysis of the modal operator: For all propositions about
a property, if there were a proposition specifying a predicate s.t. the property
is in the predicate’s extension, then there would be that property. Conversely,
for all propositions specifying a predicate s.t. a property is in the predicate’s
extension, if there were that property, then there would be a predicate which
refers to that property.
From ‘[p ⇐⇒ ⋄q]’, one can derive both ‘p ⇐⇒ ⋄q’, and – by the rule,
RK – the necessitation thereof, ‘p ⇐⇒ ⋄q’ (op. cit.). By the B axiom
in S5, ⋄q ⇐⇒ ⋄q (op. cit.). So, ‘⋄q ⇐⇒ ⋄q’; ‘⋄q ⇐⇒ p’; and ‘⋄q
⇐⇒ p’. Thus – by transitivity – ‘p ⇐⇒ p’ (op. cit.); i.e., all propositions
about properties are necessarily true, such that the corresponding properties
have necessary being. By the 4 axiom in S5, p ⇐⇒ p; so, the necessary
being of properties and propositions is itself necessary. Given the endorsement
of the abundant conception of properties – Hale and Wright are thus committed
to higher-order necessitism, i.e., the necessary necessity of being.
Hale (2013b) endeavors to block the ontological commitments of the Bar-






16Proponents of the translation from modal operators into counterfactual form include Stal-









6. ∀x[F(x) → ∀[F(x)],
Hale imposes an existence-entailing assumption in the inference from lines
(2) to (3), i.e.
’(Free∀-Elimination) From ∀x[A(x)], together with an existence-entailing
premise F(t), we may infer A(t) where t can be any term’ (op. cit.: 208-209).
Because the concept of, e.g., cardinal number is defined by abstraction prin-
ciples which are purely general because they embed no singular terms, the prop-
erties – e.g., the concepts – of numbers are argued to have necessary being. The
necessary being of the essential properties of number – i.e., higher-order Neces-
sitism about purely general properties – is argued then to explain in virtue of
what abstract objects such as numbers and functions have themselves necessary
being (176-177). Thus the necessary being of predicate sense for the concept
of number can both suffice for and explain the necessary being of predicate
reference, i.e. the necessary existence of numbers.
By contrast, essential properties defined by theoretical identity statements,
which if true are necessarily so, do embed singular terms and are thus not purely
general. So, the essential nature of water, i.e., the property ’being comprised
of one oxygen and two hydrogen molecules’, has contingent being, explaining in
virtue of what samples of water have contingent being (216-217).
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3.2.1 Objections
One argument against the above approach is that there is an asymmetry in the
order of explanation with regard to whether properties or objects are the source
of the contingency with which the lower- and higher-order entities have being.
Concrete individuals susceptible to being defined via theoretical identity state-
ments have, as noted, contingent being because the identity statements charac-
terizing the essential properties – e.g., the concepts – of those individuals are
not purely general, because they embed singular terms (op. cit.). However, for
concrete individuals which cannot be defined via theoretical identity statements,
the order of explanation is reversed. The contingency of the essential proper-
ties of concrete individuals, such as stars, depends upon the existence-entailing
premise noted above (217). Thus, because concrete first-order objects such as
stars can be rendered non-concrete, they have contingent being. Higher-order
Contigentism is argued, then, to take into effect, because the essential proper-
ties thereof exist only when their corresponding objects do so. An explanation
of the asymmetry in the foregoing order of explanation of first-and higher-order
Contingentism is, however, wanting.
The necessary being of purely general properties – e.g., the possible predi-
cate sense for the concept of number – is argued to hold with absolute modality,
as the consequent of a counterfactual with an unrestrictedly general antecedent.
As Hale notes, absolute modalities are therefore logical modalities (100). Thus,
a crucial virtue of the logical necessity with which the concept of number – and
thus the numbers themselves – have being, is that it provides a further vindica-
tion of the Neo-logicist thesis, that second-order logic and identity as augmented
by the purely general abstraction principles is sufficient to derive the axioms
of mathematical languages such as Peano arithmetic. The Neo-logicist thesis
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is qualified, however, by the caveat that abstraction principles are non-logical
truths, i.e., they are not true on all interpretations of the values of the variables
comprising their syntactic form. By arguing that purely general properties have
necessary being and defining the necessity of being of purely general properties
as logical necessity, abstraction principles – while not themselves logically true –
can thus still hold of logical necessity. The logical necessity of abstraction prin-
ciples – owing to the purely general predicates comprising their form – can thus
serve to explain another sense in which the abstractionist foundations provide
a logical reduction of mathematical truths. Mathematical truths will, on the
above approach, be derivable from second-order logic with identity and implicit
definitions which are true of logical necessity.
A second objection to the foregoing is that Hale takes the modal status of the
being with which both logical and non-logical properties exist to be equivalent.
Following Fine (2005), he notes that there is a distinction between ’unworldly’ or
’transcendental’ truths about individuals, which are true, in Fine’s phrasing, ’on
the basis of [their] logical form alone and without regard to the circumstances’
(Fine, op. cit.: 324). An example of a transcendental truth is that ’Hypatia
is self-identical’, i.e., ’∃x(x = H ∧ x = x)’. A ’worldly’ or ’necessary’ truth
is, by contrast, one whose truth-value is defined in a world; e.g., that ’water
= H20’ or – if one were to augment one’s language with an existence predicate
beyond the quantifiers – that ’Socrates exists or does not exist’ (op. cit.).
However, Hale draws, as noted, no similar distinction between the modal
status of a sentence true in virtue of its logical form, and a worldly sentence
whose truth depends on non-logical values of its constituent variables, e.g., a
truth of physics (Hale, op. cit.: 215). Hale (2000/2001: 415) notes Wright’s
(2001: 315) argument that the conjunction of two predicates, e.g., being blue and
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being self-identical, is equivalent to one of the conjuncts, e.g., being blue. Thus,
the predicate for the property, being self-identical, cannot be purely general.
He argues, thus, that the truth of ’this star is self-identical’ depends on the
concrete existence of the star, such that the logical property, being self-identical,
has contingent being. Thus, the status of the being of logical properties is
contingent, in the same manner that the essential property, being, e.g., H20,
depends on concrete instances of water.
A problematic consequence of the foregoing is that the logical necessity of a
formula will thus depend on whether the predicates therein are purely general
by embedding no singular terms, rather than on whether the formula at issue
is a logical truth. It might be replied that Hale is following Frege in defining
one of the constitutive marks of logical truths as consisting in their generality –
e.g., the generality of their application (1893/2013: XV; 1897/1997), as well as
whether the formula is a true universal generalization (op. cit.: §8-9) – rather
than Tarski’s (1936/1983: 415-417) definition of a logical truth as a formula true
in virtue of its logical form and thus whose truth is invariant under permutation
of the values of the variables which replace the non-logical constants therein.
However – even if not a purely general property because it embeds singular
terms – the reflexivity of identity is a logical law, because – as Frege himself
writes of reflexivity – ’the value of this function is always the True, whatever
we take as argument’ (Frege, 1891/1997: 23).17
A final objection concerns the necessary being of different types of num-
bers. While an abstraction principle for cardinal numbers can be specified using
only purely general predicates – i.e., Hume’s Principle –abstraction principles
17For further discussion of Frege’s treatment of logic as a ’purely general science’, see Dum-
mett (1991: 224-225); MacFarlane (2002); Burge (2005: 133, 137-138); and Blanchette (2012:
1.1, 1.22, 3.6). For further discussion of Tarski’s account of logical truth, see Etchemendy
(1990/1999), McGee (1992, 1996), Gómez-Torrente (1996), Chihara (1998), Feferman (1999),
and Sher (2008).
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for imaginary and complex numbers have yet to be specified. Shapiro (2000)
provides an abstraction principle for the concepts of the reals by simulating
Dedekind cuts, where abstraction principles are provided for the concepts of the
cardinals, natural numbers, integers, and rational numbers, from which the reals
are thence defined: Letting F,G, and R denote rational numbers, ∀F,G[C(F) =
C(G) ⇐⇒ ∀R(F≤R ⇐⇒ G≤R)]. 18 Hale’s (2000/2001) own definition of the
concept of the reals is provided relative to a domain of quantities. The quantities
are themselves taken to be abstract, rather than physical, entities (409). The
quantitative domain can thus be comprised of both rational numbers as well as
the abstracts for lengths, masses, and points.19 The reals are then argued not
to be numbers, but rather quantities defined via an abstraction principle which
states that a set of rational numbers in one quantitative domain is identical to
a set of rational numbers in a second quantitative domain if and only if the
two domains are isomorphic (407).20 Hale argues, then, that it is innocuous for
the real abstraction principle to be conditional on the existence of at least one
quantitative domain, because the rational numbers can be defined, similarly as
on Shapiro’s approach, via cut-abstractions and abstractions on the integers,
naturals, and cardinals. Thus, the reals can be treated as abstracts derived
from purely general abstraction principles, and are thus possessed of necessary
being. However, abstraction principles for imaginary numbers such as i =
√−1,
and complex numbers which are defined as the sum of a real number and a
second real multiplied by i, have yet to be accounted for. The provision of an
abstraction principle for complex numbers would, in any case, leave open the
18See Dedekind (1872/1996: Sec. 4), for the cut method for the definition of the reals.
19An abstraction principle for lengths, based on the equivalence property of congruence
relations on intervals of a line, or regions of a space, is defined in Shapiro and Hellman (2015:
5, 9). Shapiro and Hellman provide, further, an abstraction principle for points, defined as
comprising, respectively, the left- and right-ends of intervals (op. cit.: 5, 10-12).
20Cf. Hale (op. cit.: 406-407), for the further conditions that the domains are required to
satisfy.
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inquiry into how, e.g., complex-valued wave functions might interact with physi-
cal ontology; e.g., whether such functions might be metaphysically fundamental
entities which serve to represent physical fields in higher-dimensional spacetime,
and whether or how the domain of the functions, i.e., a real-valued configuration
space for particles, might relate to the higher-dimensional, complex-valued wave
function (cf. Simons, 2016; Ney, 2013; Maudlin, 2013).
The modality in the Barcan-induced Necessitist proposal at first- and higher-
order is, as noted, interpreted metaphysically rather than logically, and thus
incurs no similar issues with regard to the interaction between purely general
properties, logical properties, and concrete entities. Further, because true on
its second-order universal generalization on its intended, metaphysical inter-
pretation, the possible truth-in-a-model of the relevant class of formulas is, as
discussed in Section 3.1, thus sufficient for entraining the actual truth of the
relevant formulas.
3.3 Cardinality and Extensionality
An interesting residual question concerns the status of the worlds, upon the
translation of modal first-order logic into the non-modal first-order language.21
Fritz (op. cit.) notes that a world can be represented by a predicate, in the
latter.22 However, whether objects satisfy the predicate can vary from point to
point, in the non-modal first-order class of points.23 Another issue is that modal
propositional logic is equivalent only to the bisimulation-invariant fragments of
both first-order logic and fixed-point monadic second-order logic, rather than to
21Thanks here to xx, for discussion.
22For further discussion of the standard translation between propositional modal and first-
order non-modal logics, see Blackburn et al. (2001: 84).
23Suppose that the model is defined over the language of second-order arithmetic, such that
the points in the model are the ordinals. A uniquely designated point might then be a cardinal
number whose height is accordingly indexed by the ordinals.
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the full variants of either logic (cf. van Benthem, 1983; Janin and Walukiewicz,
1996). Thus, there cannot be a faithful translation from each modal operator in
modal propositional logic into a predicate of full first- or monadic higher-order
logic.
One way to mitigate the foregoing issues might be by arguing that the lan-
guage satisfies real-world rather than general validity, such that necessarily the
predicate will be satisfied only at a designated point in a model – intuitively,
the analogue of the concrete rather than some merely possible world, simu-
lating thereby the translation from possibilist to actualist discourse (cf. Fine,
op. cit.: 211,135-136, 139-140, 154, 166-168, 170-171) – by contrast to hold-
ing of necessity as interpreted as satisfaction at every point in the model.24
The reply would be consistent with what Williamson refers to as ‘chunky-style
necessitism’ which validates the following theorems: where the predicate C(x)
denotes the property of being grounded in the concrete and P(x) is an arbi-
trary predicate, (a) ‘∀x⋄C(x)’, yet (b) ‘∀x[P(x1, . . . , xn) → (Cx1, . . . , Cx1)]’
(325-332). Williamson (33, fn.5) argues, however, in favor of general, rather
than real-world validity. A second issue for the reply is that principle (b), in
the foregoing, is inconsistent with Williamson’s protracted defense of the ‘being
constraint’, according to which ∀x[P(x1, . . . , xn) → ∃y(x = y)], i.e. if x
satisfies a predicate, then x is something, even if possibly non-concrete (148).
A related issue concerns the translation of modalized, variable-binding, gen-
eralized quantifiers of the form:
‘there are n objects such that . . . ’,
‘there are countably infinite objects such that . . . ’,




The generalized quantifiers at issue are modalized and consistent with first-
order Necessitism, because the quantifier domains include all possible – including
contingently non-concrete – objects. It might be argued that the translation is
not of immediate pertinence to the ontology of mathematics, because the fore-
going first-order quantifiers can be restricted such that they range over only
uncountably infinite necessarily non-concrete objects – i.e. abstracta – by con-
trast to ranging unrestrictedly over all modal objects, including the contingently
non-concrete entities induced via the Barcan formula – i.e., the ‘mere possibilia’
that are non-concrete as a matter of contingency; e.g., the possible star and
the possible nubula which are both actual objects and yet are such that a car-
penter actually cannot, as a matter of pairwise incompossibility, render both
concrete. However, the Necessitist thesis can be valid even in the quantifier
domain of a first-order language restricted to necessarily non-concrete entities.
If, e.g., a mathematician takes, despite iterated applications of set-forming op-
erations, the cumulative hierarchy of sets to have a fixed cardinal height, then
the first-order Necessitist thesis will still be valid, because all possible objects
will actually be still something.
The first-order Necessitist proposal engendered by taking the height of the
cumulative hierarchy to be fixed is further consistent with the addition to the
first-order language of additional intensional operators – such as those intro-
duced by Hodes (1984b) – in order to characterize the indefinite extensibility of
the concept of set; i.e., that despite unrestricted universal quantification over
all of the entities in a domain, another entity can be defined with reference
to, and yet beyond the scope of, that totality, over which the quantifier would
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have further to range.25 First-order Necessitism is further consistent with the
relatively expanding domains induced by Bernays’ (1942) Theorem. Bernays’
Theorem states that class-valued functions from classes to sub-classes are not
onto, where classes are non-sets (cf. Uzquiano, 2015a: 186-187). So, the car-
dinality of a class will always be less than the cardinality of its sub-classes.
Suppose that that there is a generalization of Bernays’ theorem, such that the
non-sets are interpreted as possible objects. Thus, the cardinality of the class
of possible objects will always be less than the cardinality of the sub-classes in
the image of its mapping. Given iterated applications of Bernays’ theorem, the
cardinality of a domain of non-sets is purported then not to have a fixed height.
In both cases, however, the addition of Hodes’ intensional operators permits
there to be multiple-indexing in the array of parameters relative to which a car-
dinal can be defined, while the underlying logic for metaphysical modality can
be S5, partitioning the space of worlds into equivalence classes. So, both the
intensional characterization of indefinite extensibility and the generalization of
Bernays’ Theorem to possible objects are consistent with the first-order Neces-
sitist proposal that all possible objects are actual, and so the cardinality of the
target universe is fixed.26
Fritz and Goodman suggest that a necessary condition on the equivalence
of propositions is that they define the same class of models (op. cit.: 1.4).
25The concept of indefinite extensibility is introduced by Dummett (1963/1978), in the
setting of a discussion of the philosophical significance of Gödel’s (1931) first incompleteness
theorem. See the essays in Rayo and Uzquiano (2006); Studd (op. cit.); Dever (ms); and
Khudairi (ms), for further discussion.
26Note that the proposal that the cardinality of the cumulative hierarchy of sets is fixed,
despite continued iterated applications of set-forming operations, is anticipated by Cantor
(1883/1996: Endnote [1]). Cantor writes: ‘I have no doubt that, as we pursue this path ever
further, we shall never reach a boundary that cannot be crossed, but that we shall also never
achieve even an approximate conception of the absolute [. . . ] The absolutely infinite sequence
of numbers thus seems to me to be an appropriate symbol of the absolute; in contrast the
infinity of the first number-class (I) [i.e., the first uncountable cardinal, ℵ0 – HK], which has
hitherto sufficed, because I can I consider it to be a graspable idea (not a representation),
seems to me to dwindle into nothingness by comparison’ (op. cit.; cf. Cantor, 1899/1967).
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The proposed translation of the modalized generalized quantifiers would be
Contingentist, by taking (NNE) to be invalid, such that the domain in the
translated model would be comprised of only possible concrete objects, rather
than the non-concrete objects as well (op. cit.).
Because of the existence of non-standard models, the generalized quantifier
that ‘there are countably infinitely many possible . . . ’ cannot be defined in first-
order logic. Fritz and Goodman note that generalized quantifiers ranging over
countably infinite objects can yet be simulated by enriching one’s first-order
language with countably infinite conjunctions. On the latter approach, finitary
existential and universal quantifiers can be defined as the countably infinite
conjunction of formulas stating that, for all natural numbers n, ‘there are n
possible ...’ (2.3).
Crucially, however, there are some modalized generalized quantifiers that
cannot be similarly paraphrased – e.g., ‘there are uncountably infinite possible
objects s.t. . . . ’ – and there are some modalized generalized quantifiers that
cannot even be defined in first-order languages – e.g. ‘most possible objects s.t.
. . . ’ (2.4-2.5)
In non-modal first-order logic, it is possible to define generalized quantifiers
which range over an uncountably infinite domain of objects, by augmenting fini-
tary existential and universal quantifiers with an uncountably infinite stock of
variables and an uncountably infinite stock of conjunctions of formulas (2.4).27
27Uncountable cardinals can be defined as follows. For cardinals, x,a,C, let C⊆a be closed
unbounded in a, if it is closed [if x < C and
⋃
(C∩a) = a, then a∈C] and unbounded (
⋃
C =
a) (Kanamori, 2012: 360). A cardinal, S, is stationary in a, if, for any closed unbounded C⊆a,
C∩S 6= ∅ (op. cit.). An ideal is a subset of a set closed under countable unions, whereas filters
are subsets closed under countable intersections. A cardinal κ is regular if the cofinality of κ –
comprised of the unions of sets with cardinality less than κ – is identical to κ. For models A,B,
and conditions φ, an elementary embedding, j: A → B, is such that φ〈a1, . . . , an〉 in A if and
only if φ〈j(a1), . . . , j(an)〉 in B (363). A measurable cardinal is defined as the ordinal denoted
by the critical point of j, crit(j) (Koellner and Woodin, 2010: 7). Measurable cardinals are
inaccessible (Kanamori, op. cit.). Uncountable regular limit cardinals are weakly inaccessible
(op. cit.). A strongly inaccessible cardinal is regular and has a strong limit, such that if λ <
21
Fritz and Goodman note, however, that the foregoing would require that the
quantifiers bind the uncountable variables ‘at once’, s.t. they must have the
same scope. The issue with the proposal is that, in the setting of modalized ex-
istential quantification over an uncountably infinite domain, the Contingentist
paraphrase requires that bound variables take different scopes, in order to coun-
tenance the different possible sets that can be defined in virtue of the indefinite
extensibility of cardinal number (op. cit.).
In order to induce the Contingentist paraphrase, Fritz and Goodman suggest
defining ‘strings of infinitely many existential and universal quantifiers’, such
that a modalized, i.e. Necessitist, generalized quantifier of the form, ‘there are
uncountably infinite possible . . . ’ can be redefined by an uncountably infinite
sequence of finitary quantifiers with infinite variables and conjunction symbols
of the form:
‘Possibly for some x1, possibly for some x2, etc.: x1,x2,etc. are pairwise
distinct and are each possibly . . . ’,
where etc. denotes an uncountable sequence of, respectively, ‘an uncountable
string of interwoven possibility operators and existential quantifiers’, and an
‘uncountable string of variables’ (op. cit.).
An argument against the proposed translation of the quantifier for there
being uncountably infinite possible objects is that it is contentious whether an
uncountable sequence of operators or quantifiers has a definite meaning [cf.
Williamson (2013: 7.7)]. Thus, e.g., while negation can have a determinate
truth condition which specifies its meaning, a string of uncountably infinite
negation operators will similarly have determinate truth conditions and yet
not have an intuitive, definite meaning (357). One can also define a positive
κ, then 2λ < κ (op. cit.). For the foregoing and further definitions, see Koellner and Woodin
(op.cit.); Kanamori (op. cit.), and Woodin (2009, 2010).
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or negative integer, x, such that sx is interpreted as the successor function,
x+1, and px is interpreted as the inverse function, x-1. However, an infinitary
expression consisting in uncountable, alternating iterations of the successor and
inverse functions – spsps. . .x – will similarly not have a definite meaning (op.
cit.). Finally, one can define an operator Oi mapping truth conditions for an
arbitrary formula A to the truth condition, p, of the formula ⋄∃xi(Cxi ∧ A), with
Cx being the predicate for being concrete (258). Let the operators commute
s.t. such that OiOj iff OjOi, and be idempotent such that OiOi iff Oi (op.
cit.). A total ordering of truth conditions defined by an infinite sequence of
the operators can be defined, s.t. that the relation is reflexive, anti-symmetric,
transitive, and connected [∀x,y(x≤y ∨ y≤x)] (op. cit.). However, total orders
need not have a least upper bound; and the sequence, OiOiOi. . . (p), would
thus not have a non-arbitrary, unique value (op. cit.). The foregoing might
sufficiently adduce against Fritz and Goodman’s Contingentist paraphrase of
the uncountable infinitary modalized quantifier.
The philosophical significance of the barrier to a faithful translation from
modal first-order to extensional full first-order languages, as well as a faithful
translation from modalized, i.e. Necessitist, generalized quantifiers to Contin-
gentist quantification, is arguably that the modal resources availed of in the
abstractionist program might then be ineliminable.
4 Epistemic Modality, Metaphysical Modality,
and Epistemic Utility and Entitlement
In this section, I address, finally, Hale and Wright’s second issue with the role
of Necessitism in guaranteeing that the possible truth of abstraction principles
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provides warrant for the belief in their actual truth. As noted, Hale and Wright
argue, against the foregoing approach, that there is non-evidential entitlement
rationally to trust that acceptable abstraction principles are true, and thus that
the terms defined therein actually refer. In response, I will proceed by targeting
the explanation in virtue of which there is such epistemic, default entitlement. I
will outline two proposals concerning the foregoing grounding claim – advanced,
respectively, in Khudairi (op. cit.), above, and by Wright (2012; 2014) – and I
will argue that the approaches converge.
Wright’s elaboration of the notion of rational trust, which is intended to sub-
serve epistemic entitlement, appeals to a notion of ‘expected epistemic utility’
in the setting of decision theory (2014: 226, 241). In order better to understand
this notion of expected epistemic utility, we must be more precise.
There are two, major interpretations of (classical) expected utility.28 A
model of decision theory is a tuple 〈A,O,K,V〉, where A is a set of acts; O is
a set of outcomes; K encodes a set of counterfactual conditionals, where an
act from A figures in the antecedent of the conditional and O figures in the
conditional’s consequent; and V is a function assigning a real number to each
outcome. The real number is a representation of the value of the outcome. In
evidential decision theory, the expected utility of an outcome is calculated as
the product of the agent’s credence, conditional on her action, by the utility of
the outcome. In causal decision theory, the expected utility of an outcome is
calculated as the product of the agent’s credence, conditional on both her action
and background knowledge of the causal efficacy thereof, by the utility of the
28For an examination of non-classical utility measures, see Buchak (2014). Non-classical
utility measures are intended to describe the innocuous rationality with which an agent’s
expected utility might diminish with the order of the bets she might pursue. In the latter
case, her expected utility will then be sensitive to her propensity to take risks relative to the
total ordering of the gambles, such that she can have a preference for a sure-gain of .5 units




First, because background knowledge concerning the causal efficacy of one’s
choice of acts is presumably orthogonal to the non-evidential rational trust to
believe that mathematical abstraction principles are true, I will assume that the
notion of expected epistemic utility theory that Wright (op. cit.) avails of relies
only on the subjective credence of the agent, multiplied by the utility that she
assigns to the outcome of the proposition in which she’s placing her rational
trust. Thus expected epistemic utility in the setting of decision-theory will be
calculated within the (so-called) evidential, rather than causal, interpretation
of the latter.
Second, there are two, major interpretations concerning how to measure the
subjective credences of an agent. The philosophical significance of this choice
point is that it bears directly on the very notion of the epistemic utility that
an agent’s beliefs will possess. So, e.g., according to pragmatic accounts of the
accuracy of one’s partial beliefs, one begins by defining a preference ordering on
the agent’s space of acts and outcomes. If the preference ordering is consistent
with the Kolmogorov axioms29, then one can set up a representation theorem
from which the agent’s subjective probability and utility measures (i.e., their
expected utility measure) can be derived.30 The epistemic utility associated
with the pragmatic approach is, generally, utility maximization.
By contrast to the pragmatic approach, the epistemic approach to measur-
ing the accuracy of one’s beliefs is grounded in the notion of dominance (cf.
Joyce, 1998; 2009). According to the epistemic approach, there is an ideal, or
29Namely: normality (which states that the probability of a tautology maps to 1); non-
negativity (which states that the probabilty operator must take a non-negative value); addi-
tivity (which states that for all disjoint probability densities, the probability of their union is
equal to the probability of the first density added to the probability of the second); and con-
ditionalization [which states that the probability of φ conditional on ψ equals the probability
of the intersection of φ and ψ, divided by the probability of ψ].
30Cf. Ramsey (1926); Savage (1954); and Jeffrey (1965).
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vindicated, probability concerning a proposition’s obtaining, and if an agent’s
subjective probability measure does not satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms, then
one can prove that it will always be dominated by a distinct measure; i.e. it will
always be the case that a distinct subjective probability measure will be closer
to the vindicated world than one’s own. The epistemic utility associated with
the epistemic approach is thus the minimization of inaccuracy (cf. Pettigrew,
2014).31
Wright notes that rational trust subserving epistemic entitlement will be
pragmatic, and makes the intriguing point that ‘pragmatic reasons are not a
special genre of reason, to be contrasted with e.g. epistemic, prudential, and
moral reasons’ (2012: 484). He provides an example according to which one
might be impelled to prefer the ‘alleviation of Third world suffering’ to one’s
own ‘eternal bliss’ (op. cit.); and so presumably has the pragmatic approach
to expected utility in mind. The intriguing point to note, however, is that
epistemic utility is variegated; one’s epistemic utility might consist, e.g., in both
the reduction of epistemic inaccuracy and in the satisfaction of one’s preferences.
Wright concludes that there is thus ‘no good cause to deny certain kinds of
pragmatic reason the title ‘epistemic’. This will be the case where, in the slot
in the structure of the reasons for an action that is to be filled by the desires
of the agent, the relevant desires are focused on epistemic goods and goals’ (op.
cit.).
31The distinction between the epistemic (also referred to as the alethic) and the pragmatic
approaches to epistemic utility is anticipated by Clifford (1877) and James (1896), with Clif-
ford endorsing the epistemic approach, and James the pragmatic. The distance measures
comprising the scoring rules for the minimization of inaccuracy are examined in, inter alia,
Fitelson (2001); Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010); and Moss (2011). A generalization of Joyce’s
argument for probabilism to models of non-classical logic is examined in Paris (2001) and
Williams (2012). A dominance-based approach to decision theory is examined in Easwaran
(2014), and a dominance-based approach to the notion of coherence – which can accommodate
phenomena such as the preface paradox, and is thus weaker than the notion of consistency in
an agent’s belief set – is examined in Easwaran and Fitelson (2015).
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Third, and most crucially: The very idea of expected epistemic utility in the
setting of decision theory makes implicit appeal to the notion of possible worlds.
The full and partial beliefs of an agent will have to be defined on a probability
distribution, i.e. a set of epistemically possible worlds. The philosophical sig-
nificance of this point is that it demonstrates how Hale and Wright’s appeal to
default, rational entitlement to trust that abstraction principles are true con-
verges with the modal approach to the epistemology of mathematics advanced
in Khudairi (op. cit.). The latter proceeds by examining undecidable sentences
via the epistemic interpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics. The
latter can be understood as recording the thought that the semantic value of
a proposition relative to a first parameter (a context) which ranges over epis-
temically possible worlds, will constrain the semantic value of the proposition
relative to a second parameter (an index) which ranges over metaphysically pos-
sible worlds. The formal clauses for epistemic and metaphysical mathematical
modalities are as follows:
Let C denote a set of epistemically possibilities, such that JφKc ⊆ C;
(φ is a formula encoding a state of information at an epistemically possible
world).
-pri(x) = λc.JxKc,c;
(the two parameters relative to which x – a propositional variable – obtains
its value are epistemically possible worlds. The function from possible formulas
to values is thus an intension).
-sec(x) = λw.JxKw,w




• Epistemic Mathematical Necessity (Apriority)
JφKc,w = 1⇐⇒ ∀c′JφKc,c′ = 1
(φ is true at all points in epistemic modal space).
• Epistemic Mathematical Possibility
J⋄cφKc 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ JPrφKc 6= ∅ ∧ >.5, else 〈∅, Prc(φ | ∅)〉.
(φ might be true if and only if its value is not null and it is greater than
.5).
Epistemic mathematical modality is constrained by consistency, and the
formal techniques of provability and forcing. A mathematical formula is meta-
physically impossible, if it can be disproved or induces inconsistency in a model.
• Convergence
∀c∃wJφKc,w = 1
(the value of x is relative to a parameter for the space of epistemically pos-
sible worlds. The value of x relative to the first parameter determines the
value of x relative to the second parameter for the space of metaphysical
possibilities).
According, then, to the latter, the possibility of deciding mathematical
propositions which are currently undecidable relative to a background math-
ematical language such as ZFC should be multi-dimensional. The epistemic
possibility of deciding Orey sentences can thus be a guide to the metaphysical
possibility thereof.32
32See Kanamori (2008) and Woodin (2010), for further discussion of the mathematical
properties at issue.
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The convergence between Wright’s and my approaches consists, then, in that
– on both approaches – there is a set of epistemically possible worlds. In the for-
mer case, the epistemically possible worlds subserve the preference rankings for
the definability of expected epistemic utility. Epistemic mathematical modal-
ity is thus constitutive of the notion of rational entitlement to which Hale and
Wright appeal, and – in virtue of its convergence with the multi-dimensional
intensional semantics here proffered – epistemically possible worlds can serve as
a guide to the metaphysical mathematical possibility that mathematical propo-
sitions, such as abstraction principles for cardinals, reals, and sets, are true.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I have endeavored to provide an account of the modal foundations
of mathematical platonism. Hale and Wright’s objections to the idea that Ne-
cessitism cannot account for how possibility and actuality might converge were
shown to be readily answered. In response, further, to Hale and Wright’s ob-
jections to the role of epistemic and metaphysical modalities in countenancing
the truth of abstraction principles and the success of mathematical predicate
reference, I demonstrated how my multi-dimensional modal approach to the
epistemology of mathematics, augmented with Necessitism, is consistent with
Hale and Wright’s conception of the epistemic entitlement rationally to trust
that abstraction principles are true. Epistemic and metaphysical modality may
thus be shown to play a constitutive role in vindicating the reality of mathe-
matical objects and truth, and in explaining our possible knowledge thereof.
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